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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATTON LEAVER and
MARGE LEAVER,
Plaint iff-Appellants,
vs.
Case No.
14722

RUTH GROSE,
[Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants of
Loganview Subdivision located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to
enjoin the Respondent from utilizing a residence located in that subdivision as a duplex dwelling.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The Plaint iff-Appellants moved the lower court for
partial summary judgment determining that the restrictive covenants
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were currently enforceable to enjoin the Defendant-Respondent from
converting a single family residential dwelling to a duplex rental unit.
(R. 19)
Upon hearing of the motion the Court entered its Order
on July 27, 1976, denying motion of the Plaintiff-Appellants and determining that the restrictive covenants are not enforceable as against
violations of said restrictions either committed or attempted after
date of May 12, 1972. (R. 31)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Respondent seeks to sustain the Order
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Respondent agrees with the Statement
of Facts as set forth in the brief of the Appellants, except wherein it
is stated that the lower court determined that the restrictive covenants
had expired on the date of May 12, 1972, and do respectively show that
the ruling of the court was that the said restrictions are not enforceable after date of May 12, 1972, (R. 31) the pleadings before the court
having shown that the alterations and modifications made by the DefendantRespondent and of which the Plaintiff-Appellants complain, were not
commenced until June 30, 1975. (R. 13)
- 2J. -Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CONSTITUTED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO
THE RESPONDENT THAT THEY WERE
ENFORCEABLE ONLY AS TO VIOLATIONS
COMMITTED PRIOR TO MAY 12, 1972
AND THEREFORE ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE AFTER THAT DATE.
Restrictive covenants are not strictly an easement in
the general view of the Courts and do not run with the land in the true
sense of the term, but such agreements are enforceable in equity and
enforcement is based upon the equitable principal of notice. 20 Am
Jur 2d, Covenants, Section 304. That is to say, the person against
whom the covenant is sought to be enforced must have had either constructive or actual notice of the restrictive covenant.
In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P2d 781, this Court
considered the elements which must be found to be present in determining whether restrictive covenants of a subdivision were enforceable as
between subsequent purchasers of lots in that subdivision. Therein the
Court determined:
"The cases appear to be unanimous in supporting
the proposition that if a general scheme for building or development is intended by the original
Grantor, subsequent Grantees may bring action
against each other to enforce the restrictive covenant.
This intent may be gathered from the
Grantor's acts and attendant circumstances. Constructive or actual notice of the general plan on
the part of the Grantee is an essential requirement
-3-
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in enforcing the restrictive covenant. M (Emphasis
added.) 169 P2d 783, 784
Therefore, the Respondent took title to her property
subject only to the specific terms and conditions of the restrictive
covenants of which she then had notice and said restrictive covenants
are enforceable against her only to the extent of the notice conveyed
and received.
Section XIV of the Building Restrictions provides as
follows:
If the parties now claiming any interest in said
residential lots hereinbefore described, or any
of them, or their heirs, successors, grantees,
personal representatives or assigns, shall violate
or attempt to violate any of the covenants and restrictions herein contained prior to twenty"- five
(25) years from the date hereof, it shall be lawful
for any other person or persons owning any other
residential lot or lots in said area to prosecute
any proceedings at law or in equity against the
person or persons, firms or corporations so
violating or attempting to violate any such covenant or covenants and/or restrictions or restriction,
and either prevent him or them from so doing or to
recover damages or other dues for such violation or
violations. (Emphasis added.) (R. 22)
The Building Restrictions were dated and recorded on
May 12, 1947. (R. 20, 22) Therefore, Section XIV now does and always
has constituted clear and concise notice that the covenants were to be
enforced only as against violations committed or attempted prior to
May 12, 1972.
The Appellants correctly assert that the lower court was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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required to find that the Respondent had constructive notice of the
restrictive covenants. The Court was neither called upon to rule
nor did it in fact rule that the Respondent had no notice of the provisions of the restrictive covenants, but rather ruled that the notice
given to and received by the Respondent constituted notice that the
restrictive covenants would not be enforced as to violations or
attempted violations occuring after May 12, 1972, and therefore,
that the restrictions were enforceable against the Respondent only
to the extent of the notice given and received and therefore, that
the same were not enforceable after May 12, 1972.
The Appellants further contend that restrictive covenants are enforceable without an express grant of authority, that it
is not necessary that the covenants specifically set forth an enforcement clause and therefore, that the subject covenants are enforceable
notwithstanding the provisions of Section XIV.

However, the question

presented is not the effect and enforceability of covenants in the
absence of an enforcement clause, but whether the specific provisions
of an existant clause are to be ignored and whether the subsequent
Grantee shall have constructive notice that such a clause is not to be
construed to mean that which it does specifically provide.
It is further argued that Section XIV of the restrictive
covenants is only a

TT

surplus paragraph" and has no effect or bearing

on the balance of the restrictions. However, the provisions of said
i—
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,-J.o
Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

paragraph are as concisely and specifically stated as are the other
paragraphs of the restrictions and any subsequent Grantee acquiring
property in the subdivision with constructive notice of those restrictions is entitled to take in reliance upon the specific provisions of that
paragraph.
The Appellants contend that those who drafted and
executed the restrictions over 29 years ago did not intend the limitation which they clearly set forth in paragraph XIV. They request
the Court to presume that those initially executing and recording the
same did not intend the subject limitation on enforcement and therefore, that neither the Respondent nor any other person so situated,
is entitled to reply on the clear and concise language of that limitation.
At 20 Am Jur 2d, Covenants, Section 185, the author
therein writes:
"Rules governing the construction of covenants
imposing restrictions on the use of land are
generally the same as those applicable to any
contract or covenant, including the rule that
where there is no ambiguity in the language
used, there is no room for construction, and
the plain meaning of the language governs/'
In Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P2d 155, this
Court held as follows:
• ". . . . whatever language is employed in
stating a restriction, such language is to be
taken in its ordinary and generally understood
and popular sense, and is not to be subjected
to technical refinement nor the words torn
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from their association and their separate
meanings sought in a lexicon.ff 423 P2d
163
The Appellants stress that it is necessary to determine
the time frame that the original makers of the restrictive covenants
intended at the time of the execution and filing of said covenants on
May 12, 1947. In that regard, it is claimed that since a majority of
the land owners in the subdivision did not vote to terminate the covenants prior to May 12, 1972, that the same were automatically extended
to date of May 12, 1982. It is asserted that this fact alone made the
covenants enforceable against violations committed after May 12, 1972,
regardless of the specific enforcement provisions as contained in Section
XIV of the covenants. Appellants point to the fact that similar covenants containing a similar enforcement clause were up held by this
Court in Freeman v. Gee, Supra.

However, that case is to be dis-

tinguished, since the violations sought to be enjoined were attempted
prior to the expiration of the initial 25 year period as specified in the
enforcement clause.
Although there is neither an ambiguity nor uncertainty
in the language of the limitation, nevertheless the Appellants request
the Court to find an ambiguity in order to venture beyond the clear
language of the document and to presume a meaning contrary to what
is specifically stated. However, even if the subject limitation is considered as unclear or ambiguous, uniformly adopted rules of construction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would dictate that the subject restrictions are not now enforceable
against this Respondent.
The Courts have uniformly held that where because
of the ambiguous language of a covenant or restriction, it is necessary to apply rules of construction, such restrictions are strictly
construed against limitations upon the use of real property and that
any doubt will be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the
property. 20 Am Jur 2d Covenants, Section 187. In Parrish v.
Richards, 8 U2d 419, 336 P2d 122 our Court determined:
M

The trial court followed the correct doctrine
that in the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions the Courts will resolve
all doubt in favor of the free and unrestricted
use of property, . . . M 336 P2d 123
The petition of the Appellants for the enforcement of
the restrictive covenants constitutes a prayer for specific performance
thereby requiring the application of the principals of equity inherent in
any specific performance action. This Court, following the unanimous
position of the Courts of other jurisdictions, has refused to make or
modify agreements between the parties standing before it and has
decreed specific performance oily where the terms of the agreement
are clear.

In Eckard v, Smith, (Utah 1974) 527 P2d 660, the Court

held:
r ''Specific performance cannot be granted
unless the terms are clear, and that clarity
must be found from the language used in the
document." 527 P2d 662
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The same principal was manifest by the Court in Pitcher v. Lauritzen,
18 U2d 368, 423 P2d 491, wherein the Court in quoting from 29 Am Jur
Specific Performance, Section 22, stated:
M

the contract must be free from doubt,
vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to
leave nothing to conjecture or to be
supplied by the Court.Tt 423 P2d 493
The Respondent respectfully submits that paragraph XIV
of the restrictive covenants provided clear and concise notice to the
Respondent and to all other parties similarly situated that said restrictive covenants were to be enforced only as against violations or attempted
violations of the restrictions committed prior to May 12, 1972, that this
Respondent took title to her property in Loganview Subdivision with notice
that said restrictions were not enforceable after May 12, 1972, and that
the same are not enforceable against her to enjoin her use of the property
undertaken after date of May 12, 1972.
CONCLUSION
In order for the lower court to have determined that the
restrictive covenants are enforceable after May 12, 1972, it would have
been required to have presumed that the original parties executing and
recording the restrictive covenants did not intend that which was specifically and clearly stated and that the Respondent was responsible to have
known the unexpressed intent entertained over 29 years ago by those
original parties. In determining the restrictions to be unenforceable,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Court was not required to entertain any presumption or apply any
rule of construction, but rather to only accept what the restrictions
clearly and concisely provided.
The Respondent respectfully submits that this Court
should sustain the order of the lower court determining that the restrictive covenants of Loganview Subdivision are not enforceable after
May 12, 1972.
Respectfully submitted,

.
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